Chapter

Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework

Editor(s):
Peter Wickham, Jacob Frenkel, and Michael Dooley
Published Date:
March 1989
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    Author(s)
    JEREMY BULOW and KENNETH ROGOFF* 

    A dynamic bargaining-theoretic framework is used to analyze multilateral negotiations for rescheduling sovereign debt. The analysis illustrates how various factors, such as the debtor’s gains from trade and the level of world interest rates, affect the relative bargaining power of various parties to a rescheduling agreement. If creditor-country taxpayers have a vested interest in maintaining normal levels of trade with debtor countries, then they can sometimes be bargained into making sidepayments. The benefits from unanticipated creditor-country sidepayments accrue to both lenders and borrowers. But the benefits from perfectly anticipated sidepayments accrue entirely to borrowers.

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