Back Matter

Back Matter

Author(s):
Manuel Guitián
Published Date:
June 1992
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    Bibliography

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    Notes

    That is, the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, which was held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1 to 22, 1944.

    The list of writings on this subject, even if constrained to the economic domain, is long, and space considerations require selectivity. But see, for example, Dam (1982) and Solomon (1982), and, for background on the IMF, Horsefield (1969), de Vries (1976, 1985, and 1986), and Southard (1979). For a fascinating account of the Bretton Woods negotiations that led to the post-World War II economic and financial order, see Keynes (1980a and b).

    Early efforts to establish principles and conventions of international economic behavior have been examined, inter alia, by Bloomfield (1959), Dam (1982), and Eichengreen(1985,1989a and b,1990, and 1991). Here again, for an insightful account of discussions, this time on the post-World War I economic and financial order, see Keynes (1971,1977, and 1978). See also Guitián (1992d).

    The reforms in previously centrally planned economies have rapidly prompted a wealth of studies searching for an efficient model of the reform process. See, for example, Blanchard and others (1991), Dornbusch (1991), Fischer and Gelb (1991), Guitián (1991 and 1992a), Hinds (1990), Collins and Rodrick (1991), Peck and others (1991), and Williamson (1991a,b, and c). Events have also been moving rapidly and remain fluid in the former U.S.S.R. A recent discussion from an economic standpoint will be found in Havrylyshyn and Williamson (1991). For recent developments in the process of economic and monetary integration in Western Europe, see Guitián (1988 and 1992c) and Ungerer and others (1990). In the period during which this paper was under preparation, important additional decisions have been made by the European Community countries in their summit meeting in Maastricht, Netherlands, on December 9-10, 1991, which included an agreement to establish a single currency by the end of the decade.

    I have examined some of these other events from the standpoint of the importance of a code of conduct in recent papers, where an extensive list of other sources can also be found: see Guitián (1992b and c).

    The provision of financial assistance was to be subject to adequate safeguards to ensure that the use of Fund resources by members would be temporary. This is one of the most important responsibilities of the institution, to which this paper will return often and which has been extensively discussed elsewhere: see Guitián (1981); see also Gold (1979a), Williamson (1983), and Kenen (1986).

    The Articles of Agreement have undergone several amendments since their inception, but they continue to contain a code of conduct by which members agree to abide. Issues related to the various amendments have been examined extensively by Gold (1969b,1978, and 1979b).

    Such a term was used by Robert Mundell in his concluding remarks to a conference on “The New International Monetary System,” jointly sponsored by the IMF and Columbia University and held at IMF headquarters in Washington, D.C., on November 11-12, 1976: see Mundell and Polak (1977).

    For further discussion, see Horsefield (1969) and de Vries (1976); see also Southard (1979), Polak (1981), and Group of Thirty (1988).

    See, for a similar argument, Group of Thirty (1988) and the collection of papers and comments in International Monetary Fund and HWWA-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg (1988). For a discussion of the difference between coordination based on continuous bargaining or on the acceptance of a given regime, see Kenen (1987a and 1990) and Guitián (1992d). See also Hirsch, Doyle, and Morse (1977) for an early discussion of these points.

    With regard to par values, in the early years of the IMF, efforts were made for members to proceed swiftly in establishing them. However, as experience was gained, the practice became for members to avoid proposing a par value unless there was an assurance that it could be maintained; see, for further discussion, de Vries (1969b). An excellent examination of the transitional arrangements regarding exchange restrictions (contained in Article XIV of the IMF Articles of Agreement) and of temporary deviations from the prescriptions of the Articles of Agreement can be found in Chapter 24 of Gold (1969a).

    Among the many possible sources where this subject is examined, the following will be of interest: Camps (1974), Williamson (1977), Dam (1982), Solomon (1982), de Vries (1976 and 1985), and Artus and Crockett (1980).

    A complete description and analysis of events during the interregnum between the Bretton Woods par value system and the second amendment of the Articles of Agreement will be found in de Vries (1976 and 1985).

    See, for an extensive discussion of issues of international economic policy coordination, Wallich (1984), Bryant (1987), Bryant and Portes (1987), Williamson and Miller (1987), Frankel (1988), Kenen (1988), and the collections of papers in: Buiter and Marston (1985), Bryant and others (1988 and 1989), and Branson, Frenkel, and Goldstein (1990).

    See Executive Board Decision No. 5392-(77/63) of April 29, 1977, in International Monetary Fund (1989). The decision has been reproduced in Crockett and Goldstein (1987), where an extensive discussion of its various aspects can be found.

    An extensive examination of the subject of surveillance can be found in Artus and Crockett (1978 and 1980), and Crockett and Goldstein (1987). See also Brau (1981), and Kenen (1987b).

    Surveillance is, of course, influenced by changes in the code of conduct. In this context, it is interesting to advance here that in the Bretton Woods order, consultations were mandatory for members availing themselves of the transitional arrangements (Article XIV) as well as for those that, having accepted the general obligations of members (Article VIII), maintained practices inconsistent with those obligations. For members that were not in those circumstances, a practice was developed for conducting regular policy consultations even though no such obligation existed: see Chapter 24 in Gold (1969a and 1978) and Camps (1981). At present, as discussed later in the paper, all members have an obligation to consult with the IMF, and the consultations include an assessment of the observance of the principles of surveillance: see Crockett and Goldstein (1987).

    As noted earlier (see Note 6), conditionality has been examined extensively and intensively, particularly since the abandonment of the Bretton Woods order. This IMF activity is fundamental also in the context of surveillance, a perspective from which it will be examined later in the paper. Other background material can be found in Gold (1979a), Guitián (1981 and 1987), Kenen (1986 and 1989), and Williamson (1983).

    The Bretton Woods order, it will be recalled, encompassed three main pillars, which would have, it was thought, a common membership with the IMF: exchange and financial matters, to be overseen by the IMF; reconstruction and development issues, which fell under the purview of the World Bank; and international trade relations, to be taken up by the International Trade Organization (ITO). In the event, the ITO did not materialize, and in its place, a (somewhat more limited) multilateral trade arrangement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1948. Despite its provisional nature, the GATT has remained the central agency in charge of trade issues and norms. See Dam (1970) and Horsefield (1969). It may be worth recalling here that IMF membership is a requirement for accession to the World Bank, which attests to the importance given to the jurisdictional authority of the IMF: see Gold (1982).

    Broad international economic policy discussions are conducted in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in a variety of frameworks. These include: two main macroeconomic policy committees, the Economic Policy Committee (EPC)—in particular, its Working Party No. 3 (WP3), where surveillance functions are undertaken—which discusses the overall outlook in the OECD area, and the Economic Development Review Committee (EDRC), where individual member country situations are reviewed periodically; a Trade Committee; the Export Credit Arrangement; the capital movements and invisible transactions codes, overseen by the Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT); the Development Assistance Committee (DAC); and various sectoral committees.

    For further elaboration on these various forums, see Wallich (1984), Putnam and Bayne (1987), and Solomon (1990). See also the reports of the Group of Ten and the Group of Twenty-Four, reproduced in Crockett and Goldstein (1987).

    The general formulation would refer to the dual aspect of rights and obligations of members and of the right and obligation of the institution to oversee the system and its parts. These general institutional issues fall beyond the scope of this paper; many of them have been examined in Gold (1979b).

    Joseph Gold, author of the quoted words, has written extensively on the subject and described this as a novel idea; it was, indeed, and it provided the basis for the jurisdictional authority of the IMF: see Chapter 24 in Gold (1969a).

    See Article IV, Section 3(b) of the Articles of Agreement in International Monetary Fund (1978). See also “Planning Surveillance of Exchange Rates,” Chapter 43 in de Vries (1985).

    The notion of balance of payments equilibrium can be refined further, of course, by requiring that it be accompanied by price stability and high levels of employment and growth. Conceptual refinement, unfortunately, adds to the operational difficulties. For an insightful discussion of the subject, see Artus and Crockett (1980); see also Mundell (1991).

    See Article VIII and Article IV of the Articles of Agreement in International Monetary Fund (1978). See also Executive Board Decision No. 5392-(77/63) in International Monetary Fund (1989) as well as “Surveillance Over Exchange Rate Policies,” Chapter II in Crockett and Goldstein (1987). It is to be noted that the Articles of Agreement allow members to exercise controls over capital transfers as “necessary to regulate international capital movements” (see Article VI, Section 3).

    This much is clearly recognized in Article IV which calls for “fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions” (Section 1(ii)). A more explicit formulation will be found in the surveillance decision, where reference is made to “the pursuit, for balance of payments reasons, of monetary and other domestic financial policies …” (Decision No. 5392-(77/63) in International Monetary Fund (1989).

    A comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of this subject will be found in Crockett and Goldstein (1987), particularly in Chapter II (see Note 26).

    The linkages of the domestic to the external policy domains have been discussed within and outside the IMF. For some of the IMF publications, apart from Crockett and Goldstein (1987). see Guitián (1981,1985, and 1987) and the sources cited in International Monetary Fund (1987). See also de Vries (1987).

    For examination and discussion of the relationship between the IMF and the World Bank and of their respective spheres of competence, see Gold (1982). The analytical underpinnings of the external implications of domestic policies have been the subject of the collection of articles in International Monetary Fund (1977); see also Mookerjee (1966).

    The evolution described in the text underlies the initiatives in the IMF to introduce the extended Fund facility (EFF) and the enlarged access policy, and in the World Bank to undertake structural adjustment lending. These subjects will be discussed further later in the paper, but background on them can be found in Guitián (1981 and 1987). Stern (1983), and Michalopoulos (1987). While the subject is closely related to the lending operations of the IMF and the World Bank, the emphasis here is on its economic policy aspects and hence its linkage, in the case of the IMF, with the issue of surveillance. For a recent examination of these questions in the context of debt strategy, see Guitián (1992b).

    For a variety of purposes, the IMF may classify countries within the membership into separate groups, but in general, such groupings carry no operational significance. A clear example of such classifications is provided by the analytical groups used in the World Economic Outlook papers which refer to industrial countries, developing countries, oil-exporting countries, etc. It is to be noted that the IMF deliberately sought to avoid operational classifications of member countries by having those members using or returning Fund resources actually “purchase” and “repurchase” them with domestic currency rather than borrow and repay them; in this fashion, no distinction was established formally between Fund borrowers and lenders. See, in this context, Fernandez Ordoñez (1989).

    The possibility of difficulties arising from the existence of both the principle of universality and uniformity, as well as their varied resolutions, has been discussed by Gold (1979b). Pressure for distinctions among members have mounted with time and, as will be discussed later in the paper, some have been recently made.

    To give the subjects discussed in this section the treatment they deserve would call for a separate paper. Many of them, however, have been studied specifically elsewhere. Joseph Gold has written extensively on these and related subjects. For example, in addition to various papers in Gold (1969a), see Gold (1965 and 1980a and b). Let me underscore here that the differentiation among members is made from an economic and financial standpoint; from a legal standpoint. Gold (1980b, p. 70) has stressed that “all members are equal before the law of the IMF,” but he has also added the qualification that “equality before the law does not connote equality in all conceivable respects.”

    In addition, there is institutional involvement in discussions undertaken in different country groups, such as the Group of Ten and the Group of Seven. See Wallich (1984) and Kenen (1987b), among other sources.

    The Articles of Agreement provide the definition of these terms: see Article XXX(d) in International Monetary Fund (1978); for further elaboration, see Chapter 24 in Gold (1969a).

    See Note 17, which elaborates on some of these points. See, for further discussion of these questions, Gold (1978), Camps (1981), and Crockett and Goldstein (1987).

    As Notes 6 and 18 anticipate, conditionality has been the subject of intensive and extensive study within both the IMF and outside circles, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it in depth. But see Gold (1979a), Guitián (1981), Killick (1982), Williamson (1983), and Muns (1984). See also de Vries (1986 and 1987) and Kenen (1986 and 1989). An in-depth examination of the link of surveillance with conditionality will be found in the next section, which traces its evolution since the inception of the IMF.

    A very relevant consequence of this perception and, more generally, of the practical differentiation of members as borrowers from and lenders to the IMF, has recently been insightfully drawn by Kafka (1991). It contrasts the interest of borrowers in easing access to Fund resources with that of lenders in keeping such access restrained.

    In another context, I have argued the need to avoid the mirage of symmetry if there is to be clarity in the international allocation of policy responsibilities; see Guitián (1992d) for further elaboration of this subject.

    Members’ obligations with respect to furnishing specific information are spelled out in Article VIII, Section 5, of the Articles of Agreement. In the field of statistics, the IMF has become one of the major sources of international economic data. Statistical publications include: International Financial Statistics, Direction of Trade Statistics, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, and Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. In the domain of exchange arrangements, an equivalent function is served by publication of the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.

    A complete discussion of conditionality in this period is beyond the scope of the paper and would be redundant since it has already been amply studied: see International Monetary Fund (1977), Gold (1979a), Guitián (1981), and de Vries (1987); on stand-by arrangements, see Gold (1970).

    The analytical underpinnings of what later became known as the monetary approach to the balance of payments (and its subsequent logical extension to exchange rates) have been examined in International Monetary Fund (1977); see also Frenkel and Johnson (1976 and 1978) and Guitián (1976).

    Thus (as discussed in the section entitled, “Surveillance from Other Perspectives”), the new code of conduct calls for consultations with all members without any distinction between those that avail themselves of the transitional arrangements and those that do not. The adaptations to surveillance have been extensively examined in Crockett and Goldstein (1987); but see also Artus and Crockett (1978 and 1980).

    This is another subject that for the sake of brevity cannot be fully pursued here. However, sources abound that examine it extensively. See, for example, Guitián(1981,1985, and 1987) and Mohammed (1991). For a very comprehensive and recent treatment of the subject, see also Polak (1991).

    There have been exceptions to this general rule, e.g., the lapsed Trust Fund, the structural adjustment facility (SAF) and the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF), which relate to a specific group of countries and not to the membership at large.

    As already noted, trade is the domain of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an institution with which the IMF collaborates closely. For further discussion on this subject, see de Vries (1969a), Dam (1970), and de Vries (1976 and 1985).

    These include areas of common interests to the IMF and the World Bank that have already been discussed. The subject of collaboration between the IMF and the World Bank has been studied extensively: besides Gold (1982), see de Vries (1976 and 1985), Narvekar (1983), and Hino (1986).

    See Guitián (1987), where the argument is laid out in stark terms to stress that economies face resource constraints, of which foreign exchange is only one. Frequently, what emerges as binding foreign exchange constraint is but a manifestation of the broader resource constraint having been breached at an earlier stage. That is, inflation can be kept temporarily low (or growth temporarily high) at the expense of balance of payments deficits. Over time, the choice is typically between low inflation (high growth) today and high inflation (low growth) tomorrow.

    See, regarding structural adjustment lending in the World Bank, Stern (1983) and Michalopoulos (1987). On IMF-World Bank collaboration, see Narvekar (1983) and Hino (1986).

    I have discussed the subject of the international debt crisis in more detail elsewhere: see Guitián (1992b), where an extensive list of sources on international debt issues is also provided; see also Guitián (1992e).

    The issue of capital controls in the European Monetary System (EMS) has been amply investigated in the literature: see, for example, Rogoff (1985) and Artis (1987).

    See, for example, Starrels (1991). More generally, a wealth of papers and articles on economic reform has already been issued in a relatively short period to shed light on the complexities of the process of moving from central planning to a market system as the basis of economic organization. A fairly extensive list of sources and a discussion of the role of the IMF can found in Guitián (1992a).

    The philosophy of the Articles of Agreement is based on the superiority of free trade as the organizing principle of international economic interaction. However, there is no presumption in the IMF with regard to members’ individual systems of economic organization. In conformity with the principle of universality discussed earlier in the paper, all countries willing and able to abide by the prescriptions of the code of conduct can join the institution, regardless of their specific type of economic organization. See, for further discussion, Guitián (1983). For an application of the “preaching by example” argument in the area of policy coordination, see Fischer (1988).

    This subject is closely linked to the issue of sequence in the reform process, which has been discussed in numerous recent papers: see Dornbusch (1991), Fischer and Gelb (1991), Guitián (1991 and 1992a), Calvo and Frenkel (1991a and b), Genberg (1991), and Williamson (1991a).

    A prime example of such operational collaboration has been given already in the preparation of the study of the U.S.S.R. economy mandated last July 1990 by the Houston Summit: see International Monetary Fund and others (1991).

    There is, of course, nothing new in the proposal in the text. If anything, it represents a return to the original mode of operation of the IMF; but then, perhaps it is a venturesome proposal, since, after all, the conception of the original role of the institution can be called nothing short of revolutionary.

    The changes in the international economy are widespread and have been underway for some time now. Besides the relatively recent reforms in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the former Soviet area, there is the impetus toward economic and monetary integration in Western Europe, as well as the broader shift from a regime based on hegemony, to a large extent, to a multipolar system. A discussion of unipolar (hegemonic) and multipolar systems can be found in Eichengreen (1989c). An examination of issues that arise from developments in Europe at large will be found in Guitián (1992a and c).

    On policy coordination issues, see Polak (1981 and 1988) and Frenkel, Goldstein, and Masson (1988, 1989a and b, and 1990). The subject of international indebtedness has been recently discussed in Guitián (1992b and e).

    As noted earlier in the paper, the implications of reform for the scope of the functions of the IMF are pervasive. They extend certainly to surveillance and most definitely to technical assistance.

    For descriptions of IMF financial facilities, see Gold (1980a), Guitián (1981), and Polak (1991). For a description of access policy, see International Monetary Fund (1989, pp. 80 ff). On the issue of maturity of IMF resources or “repurchase” terms, as it is referred to in the institution, see Note 32.

    For an extensive discussion of the diversity of views on IMF charges, see Horsefield (1969, Vol. II, Ch. 19) and de Vries(1976, Vol. I, Ch. 19, and 1985, Vol. I, Ch. 29).

    This was the rationale for accounting for IMF transactions among official international reserve flows. Incidentally, this rationale also distinguished between the IMF and other lenders in the sense that borrowing from the IMF does not actually belong in gross external debt data. The importance of the issue regarding the monetary character of the IMF has been recently emphasized forcefully by Duisen-berg and Szasz (1991). For a broad discussion of alternative functions that could be played by the IMF, see Bryant (1984).

    This trend is particularly marked in the developments within the European Community, but it is not exclusive to them. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation in the United States belongs to this trend, as, if strictly applied, it would eliminate fiscal policy discretion altogether.

    This notion of convertibility applies to the currency of a member not resorting to the transitional arrangements available in the Articles of Agreement that permit the maintenance, adaptation, or even introduction of restrictions on current international transactions. The Articles of Agreement provide an explicit definition of the scope of current transactions, which includes an allowance for a “moderate anount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct investments” (Article XXXd). An indispensable source of reference on convertibility can be found in Gold (1971), where the IMF’s concepts of convertibility are discussed extensively. Ample treatment is given to the central concept of convertibility under the Articles of Agreement, in particular, the convertibility under Article VIII. Incidentially, this article warrants reading at this particular time when so many previously centrally planned economies are contemplating currency convertibility: see, in this context, Polak (1991b).

    For an interesting elaboration of some of these points in the context of the adjustment process, see Bergsten (1991) and Krugman (1991).

    IMF PAMPHLET SERIES

    International Monetary Fund Pamphlet Series

    (All pamphlets have been published in English, French, and Spanish, unless otherwise stated)

    *1. Introduction to the Fund. by J. Keith Horselield, First edition, 1964. Second edition, 1965. Second edition also in German.

    *2. The International Monetary Fund: Its Form and Functions, by J. Marcus Fleming. 1964. In English only.

    3. The International Monetary Fund and Private Business Transactions: Some Legal Effects of the Articles of Agreement, by Joseph Gold. 1965.

    4. The International Monetary Fund and International Law: An Introduction, by Joseph Gold. 1965.

    *5. The Financial Structure of the Fund, by Rudolf Kroc, First edition, 1965. Second edition, 1967.

    6. Maintenance of the Gold Value of the Fund’s Assets, by Joseph Gold. First edition, 1965. Second edition, 1971.

    7. The Fund and Non-Member States: Some Legal Effects, by Joseph Gold. 1966.

    8. The Cuban Insurance Cases and the Articles of the Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1966.

    9. Balance of Payments: Its Meaning and Uses, by Poul Høst-Madsen. 1967.

    *10. Balance of Payments Concepts and Definitions. First edition, 1968. Second edition, 1969.

    11. Interpretation by the Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1968.

    12. The Reform of the Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1969.

    13. Special Drawing Rights, by Joseph Gold. First edition, 1969. Second edition, with subtitle Character and Use, 1970.

    14. The Fund’s Concepts of Convertibility, by Joseph Gold. 1971.

    15. Special Drawing Rights: The Role of Language, by Joseph Gold. 1971.

    16. Some Reflections on the Nature of Special Drawing Rights, by J.J. Polak. 1971.

    17. Operations and Transactions in SDRs: The First Basic Period, by Walter Habermeier. 1973.

    18. Valuation and Rate of Interest of the SDR, by J.J. Polak. 1974.

    19. Floating Currencies, Gold, and SDRs: Some Recent Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1976. Also in German.

    20. Voting Majorities in the Fund: Effects of Second Amendment of the Articles, by Joseph Gold. 1977.

    21. International Capital Movements Under the Law of the International Monetary Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1977.

    22. Floating Currencies, SDRs, and Gold: Further Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1977. Concluding section also in German.

    23. Use, Conversion, and Exchange of Currency Under the Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles, by Joseph Gold. 1978.

    24. The Rise in Protectionism, by the Trade and Payments Division. 1978.

    25. The Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, by Joseph Gold. 1978.

    26. SDRs, Gold, and Currencies: Third Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1979. Concluding section also in German.

    27. Financial Assistance by the International Monetary Fund: Law and Practice, by Joseph Gold. First edition, 1979. In English only. Second edition, 1980.

    28. Thoughts on an International Monetary Fund Based Fully on the SDR, by J.J. Polak. 1979.

    29. Macroeconomic Accounts: An Overview, by Poul Host-Madsen. 1979.

    30. Technical Assistance Services of the International Monetary Fund. 1979.

    31. Conditionality, by Joseph Gold. 1979.

    32. The Rule of Law in the International Monetary Fund, by Joseph Gold. 1980.

    33. SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Fourth Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1980.

    34. Compensatory Financing Facility, by Louis M. Goreux. 1980.

    35. The Legal Character of the Fund’s Stand-By Arrangements and Why It Matters, by Joseph Gold. 1980.

    36. SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Fifth Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1981.

    37. The International Monetary Fund: Its Evolution, Organization, and Activities. First edition, 1981. Fourth edition, 1984.

    38. Fund Conditionality: Evolution of Principles and Practices, by Manuel Guitián. 1981.

    39. Order in International Finance, the Promotion of IMF Stand-By Arrangements, and the Drafting of Private Loan Agreements, by Joseph Gold. 1982.

    40. SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Sixth Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1983.

    41. The General Arrangements to Borrow, by Michael Ainley. 1984.

    42. The International Monetary Fund: Its Financial Organization and Activities, by Anand G. Chandavarkar. 1984.

    43. The Technical Assistance and Training Services of the International Monetary Fund. In English. Reprinted 1989.

    44. SDRs, Currencies, and Gold: Seventh Survey of New Legal Developments, by Joseph Gold. 1987.

    45. Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF, by the Treasurer’s Department. First edition, 1990. Second edition, 1991. In English. French, Spanish, and Russian in preparation.

    46. The Unique Nature of the Responsibilities of the International Monetary Fund, by Manuel Guitián. 1992. In English. French and Spanish in preparation.

    Copies (unless out of print) may be requested from:

    External Relations Department, Publication Services

    International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A.

    Telephone number: (202) 623-7430

    Telefax number: (202) 623-7201

    Cable address: Interfund

    Out of print. Photographic or microfilm copies of all English editions, including numbers that are out of print, may be purchased direct from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, U.S.A., or, for those living outside the Western Hemisphere, from University Microfilms Limited, 30/32 Mortimer St., London, WIN 7RA, England.

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