This series aims to make available to the general public and to economic policy practitioners, a selection of policy papers prepared by the staff of the International Monetary Fund. Papers in the International Economic Policy Review will offer specific policy-relevant analysis, but at a relatively non-technical level. These papers are intended to provide analytical background for IMF-supported programs and more generally to shed light on a range of policy choices facing ministries and central banks.
This paper argues that many developing countries may find it difficult to buttress disinflation programs purely through the adoption of traditional credibility-enhancing devices (such as monetary anchors and central bank independence), owing to “technical problems” (for example, high instability of money demand, increased capital mobility) and an insufficient endowment of credibility in the political institutions. In these cases, borrowing credibility from an outside agency like the International Monetary Fund may be the most effective solution. The paper discusses the different options that would allow the Fund to support programs aimed not at external adjustment—the Fund’s traditional role—but at disinflation.
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