Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management

Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management
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Volume/Issue:
2000/57
Series:
IMF Working Papers
Author(s):
G. Garcia
Publisher:
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Published Date:
March 2000
DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451847765.001
ISBN:
9781451847765
ISSN:
1018-5941
Page:
80
A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee.
Article

Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management

Author(s):
G. Garcia
Published Date:
March 2000
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